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Este artículo explora los vínculos entre inversión privada e inversión pública en las 
regiones españolas entre 1965-1997. Para ello se usa un modelo simple de 
generaciones solapadas que ilustra la existencia de un posible efecto expulsión de 
la inversión privada por parte del gasto público productivo y no productivo. A partir 
de una especificación de datos de panel que se deriva del marco teórico, los 
resultados empíricos muestran un efecto positivo de la inversión pública productiva 
y social sobre la acumulación de capital privado. Los efectos desbordamiento 
generados por infraestructuras localizadas en regiones vecinas no parecen haber 
beneficiado a la inversión privada. El consumo público y los tipos de interés han 
ejercido una influencia negativa sobre la acumulación privada. Estos resultados son 
robustos a cambios en la especificación econométrica.  
 





Public investment constitutes one of the main instruments of the regional policies. 
The existence of a direct link between infrastructure and regional income per capita 
is generally accepted. Also literature describes a positive effect of public investment 
on private capital accumulation. This paper seeks to offer empirical evidence of this 
latter relation for the case of the Spanish regions over period 1965-1997. We use a 
crowding-out theoretical framework and panel data methodology. The results show 
a positive effect of productive and social public investment (especially in education) 
on private investment. The spillovers effects generated by productive 
infrastructures located in other regions do not seem to encourage private 
investment in an individual region. Public consumption and interest rate exert a 
negative influence on private capital accumulation. These results are robust to 
changes in the econometric specification. 
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One of the most important instruments of the regional policies is public investment. This 
is especially true since the end of the 70’s, when other alternative mechanisms of 
interregional redistribution, such as development poles, subsidies to localization and so 
on,  turned out not very effective and costly both in budgetary and efficiency terms. In 
this sense, the core of public intervention in the processes of regional convergence has 
tried to ensure the necessary infrastructures for the poorest territories to increase their 
income per capita. There are at least two channels through which public investment 
affects economic growth. Firstly, the inclusion of public capital as an argument in the 
aggregate production function
1; secondly, the effects of public expenditure in capital on 
regional income by means of its complementarity with private investment. 
   
However, the theoretical and empirical support of this last issue may be questioned from 
the results offered by literature about the crowding-out effect that public spending can 
exert on the other components of the aggregated demand. Aschauer and Greenwood 
(1985), Aschauer (1988) or Barro (1989) are examples of this. Hence the relations 
between public and private investment present two opposite dimensions. On the one 
hand, when there is an increment of public spending in capital, private agents observe to 
what extent its time consumption pattern is modified. In order to adjust to this new 
situation, agents will reduce savings and thus private investment. On the other hand, if 
public capital increases the productivity of private capital, public investment will raise the 
return of private investment and the disposition of private agents for saving and 
investment; this circumstance would allow us to address a crowding-in effect of private 
investment by the public one, supporting regional policies based on public capital 
provision.   
 
                                                           
1 In order to have a general survey of these contributions, see Gramlich (1994) and Sturm (1998).   
  1The empirical evidence is not unambiguous about the crowding-out hypothesis. Aschauer 
(1989), Erenburg (1993), Easterly and Rebelo (1993), Erenburg and Wohard (1995) and 
Argimon et al. (1997) detect, under different econometric specifications and samples, that 
public and private investment are positively linked.  For the Spanish case, Flores de 
Frutos  et al. (1998) obtain similar conclusions. However, we can find studies where 
opposite results are reached. Pradhan et al. (1990), Monadjemi (1996), Nazmi and 
Ramírez (1997), Ghali (1998) and recently Voss (2002) show the existence of a 
crowding-out effect.    
   
This paper seeks to add empirical evidence on the effects that public investment has on 
the private capital accumulation in the Spanish regions. From an overlapping generations 
model, public investment is studied through a variety of concepts that enlarge the 
interpretation of results: productive public investment, in education and health and in 
bordering regions. Moreover, a panel data approach has been used and we have dealt with 
specification problems. Our estimates find a positive effect of productive and social 
public investment (especially in education) on private investment, while public 
consumption and interest rate exert a negative influence on private capital accumulation. 
On the other hand, public investment located in bordering regions does not seem to 
encourage private investment in an individual region. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Next section presents the theoretical framework and 
the model specification. The third section describes the data set we have used. Section IV 
shows the results obtained under different econometric specifications. Finally, section V 
offers some concluding remarks. 
 
II. Theoretical framework and model specification   
This section uses a very simple model for explaining causal links between public and 
private investment. Barro (1989), Aschauer (1988) or Aschauer and Greenwood (1985) 
  2study how public spending affects private investment in infinitely lived agents models. 
However, we will adopt the approach followed by Argimón et al. (1997) that simplifies 
the way of reaching those equilibrium relations. This theoretical framework is slightly 
modified in order to consider regional features. 
 
We suppose an economy populated by overlapping generations of equal size. Each 
representative household lives two periods. In his first period, he offers a fixed amount of 
labour, pays taxes and saves. For his second period, he consumes what he has saved, 
taking into account the interest rate. Formally, 
,
1
t t t t s c − − = τ ω   [1]
where   is consumption of a household when young at t, ω 
1
t c t is the wage rate, τ t is a tax 
collected by government on young people and st is savings. Tax revenues are used to 
finance public spending, consisting of public consumption and public investment.  For 
consumption at the second period, we have 
( ) , 1 1
2
1 t t t s r c + + + =   [2]
where rt+1 symbolizes the interest rate when the household is old. The utility function of a 
representative agent is given by 
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where  is public consumption, δ represents relative preference for private consumption, 
ρ is the discount rate and a(.) is a function which captures substitutability or 
complementarity between c and   (when a’< 0, both types of consumption are 
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  3Our representative household maximizes the utility function [3] subject to [1] and [2]. 
This enables us to obtain the savings function: 










σ . For the firms we define the following production function per 
worker: 
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[5]
where constant returns to scale in the three inputs (labour, private and public investment) 
are stated. Final output per capita can be used as private or public consumption or as 
private or public investment on a 1:1 basis. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that 
both private and public capital is fully depreciated in every period. So private (and public) 
capital i is equal to private (and public) investment. If factor markets are competitive, 
profit maximizing conditions are as follows: 
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According to Walras’ law, the next equilibrium conditions define the whole equilibrium 
of the economy: 
()
gt gt t t
t t g t t
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− −
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η τ
σ β α σ
β α 1  
[8]
[9]
Expression [8] refers to equilibrium in capital market
3. Expression [9] is government 
budget constraint, where public spending variables with bar are public consumption and 
                                                           
3 Capital mobility would alter this equation, although this fact is not very relevant actually because of two 
reasons. First, capital mobility is not perfect, even at a regional level; the absence of a very speedy 
convergence process or the high correlations between domestic investment and savings  (Feldstein and 
Horioka, 1980) can be proofs of this. Second, our empirical implementation of the model will use ex-post 
private investment data, i. e. taking into account interregional capital flows. 
  4investment financed by taxes collected in a region, and ηt are (positive o negative) 
transfers which that economy receives/gives from/to central government
4.  Public 
investment is bought by government at a price equal to one of the public consumption. 
When we substitute [9] in [8] and we use profit maximizing conditions, we obtain this 







































where   is the productivity of private capital which depends on private and public 
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public consumption.  On the bases of expression [10], we obtain the following function 






 = g g i i r c f i i , , ,   [11]
According to the model, some interesting results can be drawn: 1) Private investment 
maintains a positive relation with the productivity of private capital; 2) The impact of 
public consumption is not clear; an increase in non-productive public spending leads to 
bigger taxes that reduce savings and investment; something similar would happen if 
public consumption is complementary to private consumption (σ’< 0). However, if public 
spending in consumption was a substitute of private consumption (σ’> 0), the effect of 
public purchases would lead to a bigger private investment; 3) The effect of interest rate 
on private investment is unambiguously negative because a rise in r requires a bigger 
marginal productivity of private investment, that is, a smaller private investment as 
expression [6] states, ceteris paribus; and 4) Public capital accumulation may affect 
                                                           
4 It is assumed that  .  ∑ ∀ =
i
it t , 0 η
  5private investment negatively or positively; on the one hand, a rise in government 
investment requires a bigger tax collection, which implies a negative effect on private 
savings and hence on private investment; on the other hand, public investment is also 
likely to be complementary to the private one; in this case, infrastructure investment will 
affect the return of private investment positively.   
   
In order to test these links between public investment and private investment, we will 
estimate an expression such as [11] by means of panel data methodology. Our empirical 
model is based on a linear representation of [10], take into account the likely endogeneity 
of the RHS variables and the existence of an unobservable individual effect.  
 
III Data 
Our sample consists of biannual observations for the Spanish regions over period 1965-
1997. Dependent variable is the private investment rate, defined as the ratio between total 
regional private investment and private capital stock. Marginal productivity of private 
capital fi have been proxied by the average productivity, where output is regional GDP
5. 
For public consumption c  there are no data for this variable over the period 1965-1997. 
Then we have had to employ two proxy variables. The first is the share of production of 
public services in a region over the value of total production and the second is regional 
labour cost in public sector over regional GDP. Estimates are robust to the choice 
between both variables and the former has been selected to be used.  
g
 
The interest rate r is a national-level variable due to capital market is common for overall 
Spanish regions. Because of lack of data, this series has been constructed using three 
indexes according to the period (Molinas et al, 1991, and Bajo-Rubio et al, 2004, follow a 
similar strategy): before 1979 private bonds of public utilities; from 1979 to 1992 central 
                                                           
5 This is correct if we suppose that technology follows a Cobb-Douglas production function. 
  6government bonds at more than two years; and from 1993 to 1997 central government 
benchmark bond of ten years. This variable has been considered in the regressions with 
one lag in order to avoid misspecification as a result of the endogeneity of interest rate.      
 
Public investment has been used through several definitions. Firstly, we have considered 
productive public investment (roads, hydraulic infrastructures, urban structures, ports, 
airports, railways) and social public investment ( ), that is, in education and health. 
Secondly, productive public investment has been split into capital accumulation done by 
government strictu sensu ( ) and a broad concept of productive public investment: done 
by government and dependent agencies and corporations not classified as general 
government (i ). For government and social investment we consider capital spending by 
central, regional and local governments. Thirdly, social public investment has been 
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Empirical specification has also studied the spillovers effects that public investment 
placed in other regions could have on private investment. With this aim we have 
distinguished between spillovers effects generated by public investment in bordering 
regions and in overall nation (except, obviously, the region we consider). We decided to 
link the spillovers to bordering regions because the later variable provoked 
multicollinearity problems in our estimates (although with similar signs in coefficients). 
These variables are denoted by sgp,  sgs,  sge,  sgh and refers to public investment in 
productive capital, social capital, education and health, respectively. 
 
All the previous variables are measured at 1986 prices. These data can be found in 
Fundacion BBVA (1999, 2000); many of them are available in 
http://w3.grupobbva.com/TLFB/TLFBindex.htm), except interest rate, taken from Bank 
of Spain (2003). 
  7 
IV Econometric estimation and results 
The estimation of expression [11] has been obtained using panel data techniques. As is 
usual, we need to know whether a correlation between unobservable individual effects 
and the remaining regressors exist or not. Since data cover the total population of Spanish 
regions (the sample presents a determinist character), we can argue that the fixed effects 
approach is the most appropriate model. In any case, we have run a Hausman test for each 
specification and the results confirm evidence in favour of fixed effects model. On the 
other hand, first estimates of panel presented indications of first order serial correlations 
in the residuals; hence we have included a AR(1) term in the regressions and their 
(significant and stable) values are reported
6. All the estimates of equation [11] have used 
a cross-section weight to control for the different size of the regions and also a White 
covariance matrix to avoid heteroskedasticity problems in the individual series
7.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Table 1 reports coefficients for expression [11] when several concepts of public 
investment are considered. The coefficients of marginal productivity of private capital 
and interest rate appear with a highly significant value in all estimates, positive for the 
former and negative for the later. These results are consistent with the theoretical model 
presented in section II. On the other hand, public consumption whose effect on the private 
investment could be uncertain in the theoretical framework, presents an unambiguous 
negative value in our estimates. This means that this kind of public spending does not 
                                                           
6 This bad behaviour in the residuals may be a sign of misspecification problems, such as endogenous 
regressors. We deal with this issue later. 
7 Cross-section weighting consists of estimating a feasible GLS specification assuming the presence of cross-
section heteroskedasticity.  
  8encourage private investment. It may be caused by the taxes needed to finance public 
consumption and also because both kind of consumption are complementary. 
 
Productive public investment exerts a positive effect on private capital accumulation, 
bigger when a broad concept of infrastructure is taken into account rather than 
government investment solely. Conversely, in the case of social public investment, the 
results are not so unanimous; negative and significant coefficients are obtained for social 
and public investment in education, while investment in health appears as non significant. 
Anyway, these results must be interpreted with caution as long as an endogeneity 
problem can be involved in the estimates. 
 
Table 2 shows estimates for expression [11] when spillovers effects are considered. The 
values and statistical significance for the coefficients of the productivity of private 
investment, public consumption and interest rate are very similar to those obtained 
previously. The magnitude of the effect of productive public investment on private capital 
accumulation increases in this new specification, just when a negative influence of public 
investment located in bordering regions is found. In fact, these two results can be related 
between them. When a region has an adequate infrastructure endowment, this means that 
it can attract resources for investment from other regions where public capital stock is 
lower or worse. In that case, public investment becomes a powerful instrument to modify 
the private investment in a region: in a positive sense if it is placed inside the region or in 
a negative way if productive public spending is done in neighbouring regions. At this 
point, fiscal competition processes can be developed among state governments using 
public investment. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
  9However, the previous estimates may suffer an endogeneity problem caused by both 
fiscal variables and productivity of private investment. In the case of the public 
investment and consumption a reverse causality with private investment can be found. 
Government sometimes covers needs yielded by private investment when this has been 
already done; that is especially true for public investment; papers as Sturm (1998) and 
Flores de Frutos at al (1998) are concern with this possibility. In the case of the 
productivity of private investment the equation [10] in our model indicates that the return 
of private capital depends on the level of private investment. Moreover, given the 
production function we have defined, a decreasing influence of the private investment on 
its marginal productivity is to be expected. Thus it seems to be justified using 
instrumental variables (IV) methods to estimate expression [11].       
      
Hence we have used a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator where variables have 
been transformed in orthogonal deviations. Previously, we employed others two 
alternative IV specifications: Generalised Method of Moments and a 2SLS estimation 
with variables in first differences; several instruments sets were considered in both cases 
but the results had problems of inconsistency and serial correlation in the residuals as 
well as a non reasonable economic interpretation
8. Moreover our choice of a specification 
in orthogonal deviations allow us to use lagged regressors as possible instruments
9. 
Standard errors continue being robust to heteroskedasticity. 
 
                                                           
8 These estimates are available upon request. 
9 Orthogonal deviations express each observation as the deviation from the average of future observations for 
the same individual, and weight each deviation to standardise the variance. Formally, each observation 





























K , for t = 1,2, …, T-1. Running a 
regression with variables expressed in orthogonal deviations using the OLS estimator is asymptotically 
equivalent to employ the within-groups estimator of the fixed effects model on variables in levels. See 
Arellano (1988) and Arellano and Bover (1995) for further discussion.    
  10Table 3 reports the estimates for expression [11] when this methodology is used. 
Columns [1] and [2] show the coefficients when total social public investment is included 
as regressor while columns [3] and [4] present this variable split into education and 
health. In the appendix the instruments sets we have chosen for each specification can be 
seen. The statistics m1 and m2 shows no evidence of serially correlated errors
10. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
In the new scenario, the productivity of private investment and the interest rate lose 
statistical significance though their signs remain identical to the previous ones and 
consistent with the theoretical model. The coefficient of  is smaller than before and 
this fact is coherent with what we have already guessed: the productivity is an 
endogenous variable in our framework and is affected negatively by the level of private 
investment; when we control for that, a reverse causality appears in form of a smaller 
coefficient. On the other hand, the likely endogeneity of the interest rate was already 
taken into account, so this approach is redundant in this case. Public consumption holds a 
negative and significant coefficient under all specifications, although its magnitude is 
slightly smaller too. 
i f
 
The coefficients of productive and social public investment are positive and highly 
significant. The relevance of these two variables are now bigger, what means that 
endogeneity is a relevant issue in the measurement of the effects of infrastructures on 
private capital accumulation. When public investment in education and health are treated 
separately we detect that public spending in health capital continues to be insignificant; 
otherwise, productive government expenditure in education changes its coefficient from 
an unrealistic negative sign to a significant positive value. 
                                                           
10 See Arellano and Bond (1991) for a further discussion of these statistics. 
  11 
Finally, it is worthwhile to consider what happens as spillovers effects are considered in 
this IV approach. Table 4 shows the estimates of expression [11] when specifications 
with spillovers from table 2 are obtained using a 2SLS estimator. Again, details on 
instruments sets can be found in the appendix. A first look on table 4 inform us that the 
coefficients of  the productivity of private investment, public consumption and interest 
rate hold their values and statistical significance compared to those attained with IV and 
no spillovers (table 3). Again, the coefficients of productive public investment in a model 
with spillovers are more than two times those obtained without considering public 
investment in bordering regions. Also the magnitude of these negative spillovers effects 
offset the positive influence of productive public spending done inside the region. This 
circumstance may be related to the relevance of the free mobility of private capital, whose 
decisions about regional location are very sensitive to the infrastructure endowment. The 
estimated coefficients of social public investment is positive and significant at 10%, 
mainly due to the effect of public investment in education; conversely, public expenditure 
in health infrastructure continues being non significant.    
   
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE    
 
V. Conclusions  
Public investment is one of the main axes in the regional policy design. As is well known, 
regional policy pursues income redistribution, favouring the regional convergence 
processes among economies. The use of public investment for this aim is based on two 
reasons, namely: the existence of a direct relation between public spending in 
infrastructures and growth of income per capita, and the crowding-in effects of private 
investment by public capital accumulation. This last circumstance constitutes the object 
of study in this paper. In short, we have tested whether public sector investment has 
favoured private investment in the Spanish regions over period 1965-1997.  
  12 
We have used a crowding-out theoretical framework that has been estimated through 
panel data techniques. In addition, we have taken into account issues concerned with 
endogeneity of some regressors and specification problems. The results are compatible 
with the underlying theoretical framework. The coefficients estimated show that there 
exists a positive influence of productivity of private capital on private investment ratio, 
while a negative effect is detected from public consumption and interest rate. Also we 
have found a positive effect of productive public investment on regional private 
investment rate, showing that the crowding-in has prevailed vs. crowding-out effect. A 
similar thing happens when we consider social public investment, especially in education. 
Regarding the consequences of the spillover effects generated by infrastructures located 
in other regions, the results suggest the existence of a crowding-out effect of private 
investment by public investment done in bordering regions; simultaneously, productive 
public spending in a region present a bigger influence on private capital accumulation 
when spillovers are considered.     
   
Some political implications can be guessed from this paper. One of them refers to the 
relevance that different kinds of public spending have on economic performance. Since 
public investment exerts a positive influence on private investment, government spending 
cuts should consider this fact if they are worried for a long-run economic growth. Other 
recommendation is related to the importance of public investment on regional 
convergence processes. Government intervention in this issue may attract private 
investment to the poorest areas. It will also allow reducing the differences in regional 
income per capita, even in presence of agglomeration forces that would probably favour 
the richest regions. 
 
 
  13Appendix 
This appendix collects the definition of instruments sets we have considered in section 
IV. Table 3 includes estimates of the expression [11] when a 2SLS estimator is used and 
variables model are transformed in orthogonal deviations. The matrices of instruments 
have been the following: 
·  Column (1): lagged levels of productivity of private investment, productive and social 
public investment; public consumption and interest rate expressed in orthogonal 
deviations. 
·  Column (2): lagged levels of productivity of private investment, public consumption 
and productive and social public investment; interest rate expressed in orthogonal 
deviations. 
·  Column (3): lagged levels of productivity of private investment, productive and 
education and health public investment, and interest rate; lagged orthogonal deviations of 
public consumption. 
·  Column (4): lagged levels of productivity of private investment, productive and 
education public investment; lagged orthogonal deviations of public consumption; 
interest rate and public investment in health expressed in orthogonal deviations. 
 
Table 4 includes estimates of the expression [11] when a 2SLS estimator is used, 
variables model are transformed in orthogonal deviations and spillovers effects are 
included: 
·  Column (1): lagged levels of productivity of private investment and productive public 
investment; lagged orthogonal deviations of public consumption; interest rate, social 
public investment and spillovers from social and productive public investment expressed 
in orthogonal deviations. 
·  Column (2): lagged levels of productivity of private investment and productive and 
social public investment; lagged orthogonal deviations of public consumption; interest 
  14rate and spillovers from social and productive public investment expressed in orthogonal 
deviations. 
·  Column (3): lagged levels of productivity of private investment and productive, 
education and health public investment; lagged orthogonal deviations of public 
consumption; interest rate, and spillovers from productive, education and health public 
investment expressed in orthogonal deviations. 
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r   -0.10*** (0.02) -0.09*** (0.02)  -0.09*** (0.02)  -0.09*** (0.02)
g i   0.04** (0.02)       
p g i     0.06** (0.03)  0.07*** (0.03)  0.06** (0.02) 
s g i      -0.03**  (0.01)   
e g i       -0.04***  (0.01)
gh i       0.01  (0.01) 
AR(1)  0.48*** (0.05)  0.48*** (0.05)  0.49*** (0.05)  0.48*** (0.05) 
RRS  0.03 0.03 0.03  0.03 
Durbin-Watson  2.32 2.34 2.32  2.29 
Hausman  164.79 154.53 161.24  164.97 
Observations  272 272 272  272 




  19Table 2. Crowding-out effect with spillovers. Spanish regions, 1965-1997 
Dependent variable: Private investment rate  
 [1]  [2]  [3] 
i f   0.18*** (0.03)  0.20*** (0.03)  0.18*** (0.03) 
g c   -0.23*** (0.05) -0.29*** (0.05)  -0.28*** (0.05) 
r   -0.08*** (0.02) -0.07*** (0.02)  -0.08*** (0.02) 
p g i   0.13*** (0.03)  0.14*** (0.03)  0.12*** (0.03) 
s g i    -0.01  (0.01)  
e g i      -0.01  (0.01) 
gh i      0.005  (0.01) 
sgp  -0.16*** (0.04) -0.15*** (0.04)  -0.12*** (0.04) 
sgs   -0.04**  (0.02)  
sge     -0.06***  (0.01) 
sgh     0.03*  (0.02) 
AR(1)  0.47*** (0.05)  0.50*** (0.05)  0.49*** (0.05) 
RRS  0.03 0.03 0.03 
Durbin-Watson  2.26 2.21 2.17 
Hausman  23.49 167.61  139.23 
Observations  272 272 272 




  20Table 3. Crowding-out effect. Spanish regions, 1965-1997.  
IV Estimator. Dependent variable: Private investment rate  
 [1]  [2]  [3]  [4] 
i f   0.12 (0.09)  0.13* (0.07)  0.10 (0.07)  0.14* (0.08) 
g c   -0.15** (0.06)  -0.14** (0.06)  -0.18*** (0.04)  -0.15*** (0.05)
r   -0.07 (0.05)  -0.07 (0.05)  -0.05 (0.05)  -0.07 (0.05) 
p g i   0.11*** (0.04)  0.11*** (0.04)  0.11*** (0.04)  0.12*** (0.04) 
s g i   0.05*** (0.02)  0.05** (0.02)     
e g i       0.04** (0.02)  0.04** (0.02) 
gh i       0.008 (0.01)  0.008 (0.02) 
RSS   0.04 0.04 0.04  0.04 
m1  2.078 2.189 2.241  2.132 
m2  1.576 1.755 1.878  1.784 
Observations  255 255 255  255 




  21Table 4. Crowding-out effect with spillovers. Spanish regions, 1965-1997.  
IV Estimator. Dependent variable: Private investment rate  
 [1]  [2]  [3] 
i f   0.15* (0.08)      0.16* (0.09)  0.15* (0.09) 
g c   -0.15*** (0.06) -0.13** (0.06)  -0.14** (0.06) 
r   -0.08* (0.05)  -0.07 (0.05)  -0.07 (0.05) 
p g i   0.34*** (0.12)  0.31*** (0.10)  0.31*** (0.10) 
s g i   -0.01 (0.01)  0.05* (0.03)   
e g i      0.04**  (0.02) 
gh i      -0.01  (0.03) 
sgp  -0.34** (0.15)  -0.31** (0.13)  -0.31** (0.13) 
sgs  0.03 (0.03)  -0.02 (0.04)   
sge     -0.04  (0.03) 
sgh     0.03  (0.04) 
RSS   0.04 0.04 0.03 
m1  2.232 2.208 2.110 
m2  1.519 1.416 1.517 
Observations  255 255 255 
 Notes: ***, **, * Significant at a 1%, 5%, 10% level. Standard errors between parentheses. 
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